Abstract. In this paper, we introduce a notion of Oblivious Keyword Search (OKS). Let W be the set of possible keywords. In the commit phase, a database supplier T commits n data. In each transfer subphase, a user U can choose a keyword w ∈ W adaptively and find Search(w) without revealing w to T , where Search(w) is the set of all data which includes w as a keyword.
Introduction

Background
The notion of oblivious transfer (OT ) was introduced by Rabin [22] . It has many flavors such as 1-out-of-2 OT (OT 2 1 ) [13] , 1-out-of-n OT (OT n 1 ), under the name of ANDOS [5, 6] , adaptive k-out-of-n OT (adaptive OT n k ) [19] , and oblivious polynomial evaluation (OPE) [18] . Each of them is a two party protocol between a sender S and a chooser C. In a OT 2 1 protocol, S has two secret strings M 0 and M 1 , and C has a secret bit b. C learns M b , but nothing more. S gains no information on b. Essentially every known suggestion of public-key cryptography allows to implement OT 2 1 protocols. Therefore, OT 2 1 protocols can be based on factoring, Diffie-Hellman and so on. See [1] for ElGamal based OT 2 1 protocol, for example. [20] proved its security formally in the random oracle model. OT , OT 2 1 and OT n 1 are all equivalent in the information theoretic sense [5, 12, 7] .
On the other hand, an adaptive OT n k protocol consists of a commit phase and a transfer phase. In the commit phase, a sender S commits n secret strings M 1 , · · · , M n . In each transfer subphase j (1 ≤ j ≤ k), a chooser C chooses an index i j adaptively and obtains M i j . (i j may depend on all the previous information C learned.) However, C learns nothing more and S gains no information on i 1 , · · · , i k . Naor and Pinkas [19] showed two adaptive OT n k protocols, a DDH based protocol and a random oracle based one, such that each transfer subphase involves log 2 n invocations of a OT 2 1 protocol. In a more theoretical aspect, Kilian [16] and Goldreich and Vainish [15] showed that we can implement general oblivious function evaluation by using a OT 2 1 protocol, i.e. S can let C evaluate any function f (X) for the input x * without revealing f (X) to C while S gains no information on x * .
OP E is a special case such that f (X) is a polynomial over a field F. Naor and Pinkas [18] showed an efficient OP E protocol whose complexity does not depend on F, except that it uses a OT 2 1 protocol over F. A modified version of this protocol works if the polynomial reconstruction problem is hard [4, page 64] . (Naor and Pinkas first assumed that the noisy polynomial problem is hard in [18] . However, this assumption was shown to be weaker than expected in [4] .)
Our Contribution
In this paper, we introduce a notion of Oblivious Keyword Search (OKS). In an OKS protocol, there is a database supplier who possesses some secret data. It allows a user to search and retrieve the data containing some keywords chosen by the user in such a way that the chosen keywords are unknown to the data supplier.
That is, let W be the set of possible keywords. In the commit phase, a database supplier T commits n data (through a CD-ROM or DVD). In each transfer subphase, a user U can choose a keyword w ∈ W adaptively and find Search(w) on the pay-per-view basis without revealing w to T , where Search(w) is the set of all data which includes w as a keyword. This is a new and interesting cryptographic primitive that should have real-world applications.
We then show two efficient protocols, one is based on the one-more RSA inversion problem and the other is based on the polynomial reconstruction problem. In our protocols, the size of the commitments is only O(n × B) regardless of the size of W , where B is the length of each data. It is formally proved that U learns nothing more and T gains no information on the keywords which U searched for in the random oracle model. We further present a more efficient adaptive OT n k protocol than the previous one [19] as an application of our second OKS protocol.
More formally, a k-out-of-n OKS protocol (OKS n k protocol) is a twoparty protocol between a database supplier T and a user U. In the commit phase, T commits n data B 1 , . . . , B n such that
where w i ∈ W is a keyword and c i is a content. The transfer phase consists of k subphases. In each subphase j (1 ≤ j ≤ k), U chooses a keyword w * j ∈ W adaptively and learns Search(w * j ). (Remember that Search(w * j ) is the set of all data which includes w * j as a keyword.) However, U learns nothing more about the data and S gains no information on the keywords w * 1 , · · · , w * k which U searched for. Our first OKS n k protocol uses the RSA blind signature scheme [9] which is often used for e-cash systems. Bellare et.al proved that the RSA blind signature scheme is secure if the One-More RSA-inversion problem is hard [2, 3] . We prove that our first OKS n k protocol is secure under the same assumption.
Our first protocol is very efficient. However, the intractability assumption on the One-More RSA-inversion problem is new and very strong [3, page 4] . Therefore, we show our second OKS n k protocol which is based on a more widely accepted assumption.
Our second OKS n k protocol uses an OP E protocol. It is known that there exists an OP E protocol if the polynomial reconstruction problem is hard [18, 4] . Our second protocol is secure under this assumption.
We further present a more efficient adaptive OT n k protocol than the previous one [19] as an application of our first OKS n k protocol. At each transfer subphase, it requires executing the RSA blind signature scheme once while the previous scheme [19] (BS stands for "blind signature scheme".)
Comparison with Adaptive OT n k
Remember that {w 1 , · · · , w n } ⊂ W is the set of keywords which actually appear in the database, where W is the set of all possible keywords. We require that
• Suppose that w i appears L i times in the data base. Then U should not be able to know even L i .
Actually, we can construct an OKS n k protocol by using an adaptive OT n k protocol as follows. Consider a |W |×n matrix such that the ith row includes all the indices of data whose keyword isŵ i , whereŵ i is the ith element of W . Then the size of the sender's commitments will be O(n|W | + nB) because some keywordŵ ∈ W may appear in all the n data. In the proposed OKS n k protocols, on the contrary, the size of the commitments is only O(nB) independently of W .
Other Related Work
In [10] , the private retrieval by keywords problem is discussed in the context of private information retrieval (PIR) [11, 17, 14, 8] . In this problem, T has n strings M 1 , · · · , M n and U has a keyword w. A solution to this problem is a protocol which allows U to find out if there exists M j such that M j = w. That is, the output of U is yes or no. This problem is clearly different from ours.
In [23] , Song, Wagner and Perrig considered the following scenario. Suppose that Alice does secret keyword searches playing with Bob. Then Alice first encrypts the data and gives the ciphertexts to Bob. On the other hand, in our paper, Bob encrypts the data and gives the ciphertexts to Alice. Hence our problem is different from [23] and it is impossible to apply their technique to our problem.
Organization of the Paper
In Sec. 2, we introduce a model and definitions of OKS n k protocols. In Sec. 3, we show our first OKS n k protocol which is based on the RSA blind signature scheme. In Sec. 4, we present a more efficient adaptive OT n k protocol than the previous one [19] as an application of our first OKS n k protocol. In Sec. 5, we show our second OKS n k protocol which is based on OP E. Throughout the paper, all players are probabilistic polynomial-time interactive Turing machines. l denotes a security parameter.
Oblivious Keyword Search
In this section, we introduce a notion of Oblivious Keyword Search (OKS). A k-out-of-n OKS protocol (OKS n k protocol) is a two-party protocol between a database supplier T and a user U as follows. Let W be the set of keywords. In the commit phase, T commits n data B 1 , . . . , B n such that
where w i ∈ W and c i is a content. Define
The transfer phase consists of k subphases. At each subphase j (1 ≤ j ≤ k), U chooses a keyword w * j ∈ W adaptively and learns Search(w * j ). However, C learns nothing more and S gains no information on w * 1 , · · · , w * k . More formally, (The User's Security) A protocol is secure for the user if for any malicious database supplier T , the view of In this section, we show an efficient OKS n k protocol under the intractability assumption of the one-more RSA-inversion problem. In this OKS n k protocol, RSA blind signature scheme is executed once at each transfer subphase.
RSA Blind Signature Scheme
In a blind signature scheme, Bob can ask Alice to sign a message M without revealing M . Let (N, e) be an RSA public key of Alice and let d be the secret key. Let H be a random hash function. Then the RSA blind signature scheme is described as follows.
(
Step 1) Suppose that Bob wishes to get Alice's signature of a message M .
Then he first chooses a random number r and computes
He sends Y to Alice.
Step 2) Alice computes S = Y d mod N and sends it back to Bob.
(Step 3) Bob obtains a signature S of M as
To define the security, we consider a forger who is allowed to play the role of Bob. His task is to compute m + 1 message-sgnature pairs while he is allowed to make at most m ∈ N queries to Alice for some m. We say that the RSA blind signature scheme is secure if the success probability of any polynomial time bounded forger is negligible.
Formally [21, 2] , let F be a forger who has access to RSA-inversion oracle (Alice) and hash oracle H. Consider the following experiment, where l is a security parameter.
Experiment EXP
where m ∈ N. If the following are all true, then return 1 else return 0:
• F made at most m queries to its RSA-inversion oracle.
Definition 3.1
The RSA blind signature scheme is polynomially-secure against one-more forgery if the probability Pr(EXP f orge F (l) = 1) is negligible for any forger F whose time-complexity is polynomial in the security parameter l.
Bellare et al. proved that the RSA blind signature scheme is secure if the RSA known target inversion problem (RSA-KTI) is hard [2, 3] . In RSA-KIT problem, an adversary is given m + 1 random targets y 1 , · · · , y m+1 ∈ Z N . His task is to compute y d 1 , · · · , y d m+1 mod N while he is allowed to make at most m queries to RSA-inversion oracle.
Formally, let A be an adversary who has access to RSA-inversion oracle. Consider the following experiment, where l is a security parameter and let m : N → N be a function of l.
Experiment EXP inv
A,m (l):
If the following are both true, then return 1 else return 0:
• A made at most m(l) oracle queries. RSA-KTI is also called the one-more RSA inversion problem. Commit phase T generates a public key (N, e) and a secret key d of RSA. T publishes (N, e). Next for i = 1, . . . , n, T computes
OKS
where || denotes concatination. T sends E 1 , . . . , E n to U.
Transfer phase At each transfer phase j,
(
Step 1) U chooses a keyword w * j .
Step 2) U chooses a random element r and computes
U sends Y to T . 
(Step 4) U computes
.
Security
Correctness: At each transfer phase j, the final J is equal to Search(w * j ) with probability at least 1 − n/2 l .
User's security: T has no information on w * 1 , · · · , w * k because they are blinded in the RSA blind signature scheme.
We next prove the database's security by assuming that RSA-KTI is hard. For any malicious U who queries to T (for RSA blind signatures) k times, we will show a simulator A in the ideal world. In the commit phase, A generates (N, e, d) and sends (N, e) to U. A also chooses E 1 , · · · , E n randomly and sends them to U. In the transfer phase, A behaves in the same way as T . A can do this because A chooses (N, e, d ) by itself. Finally A outputs the output of U.
A simulates H as follows. If U queries w to H for the first time, then A chooses a random string y w and sets H(w) = y w . It is clear that A simulates H perfectly.
A simulates G as follows. Wlog, we can assume that U queries w to H before U queries w K i to G. Let cnt = 0. Let QA-list be empty. Suppose that U queries w K i to G for the first time.
If w is included in QA-list, then goto 4. Else, let cnt := cnt + 1.
If cnt ≥ k + 1, then A sets G(w K i) at random. Else A queries w to the TTP and receives Search(w). A adds (w, Search(w))
to QA-list.
Suppose that w is included in QA-list, i.e., (w, Search(w))
Otherwise, A sets G(w K i) at random.
Let BAD be the event that cnt ≥ k + 1. If BAD does not occur, then A simulates G perfectly. Note that Pr(BAD) is the probability that U succeeds in the one-more forgery attack on the RSA blind signature scheme.
From Proposition 3.1, it is negligible if the RSA known target inversion problem (RSA-KTI) is hard. Consequently, the outputs of A and U are indistinguishable if the RSA known target inversion problem (RSA-KTI) is hard.
Therefore, we obtain the following theorem. This protocol executes the RSA blind signature scheme once at each transfer subphase. Therefore, it is more efficient than the previous adaptive OT n k protocol [19] which requires log 2 n invocations of a OT 2 1 protocol at each transfer subphase.
Adaptive Oblivious Transfer
An adaptive k-out-of-n Oblivious Transfer OT n k protocol consists of a commit phase and a transfer phase. In the commit phase, the sender S commits n secret strings The requirement is that for any malicious chooser C, there exists a simulator A that plays the role of the chooser in the ideal world such that the output of A is computationally indistinguishable from the output of C. 
New Adaptive
Then it is easy to see that we obtain an adaptive OT n k protocol. Q.E.D
Our adaptive OT n k protocol is described as follows. Commit phase S generates a public key (N, e) and a secret key d of RSA. S publishes (N, e). Next for i = 1, . . . , n, S computes
where M 1 , . . . , M n are the secret messages of S. S sends E 1 , . . . , E n to C.
Step 2) C chooses a random element r and computes
C sends Y to S.
(Step 3) S computes K = Y d mod N and sends it to C.
(Step 4) C computes
K = K /r = H(i j ) d mod N and obtains M i j as M i j = E i j ⊕ G(K i j ).
OKS n k Protocol Based on OP E
In this section, we show an OKS n k protocol such that an oblivious polynomial evaluation (OPE) protocol is executed at each transfer subphase. It is known that there exists an OP E protocol if the polynomial reconstruction problem is hard [4, page 64 ]. Our protocol is secure under the same assumption.
Let F be a finite field.
Problem 5.1 (Polynomial reconstruction) Given as input integers k, t, and
, outputs all univariate polynomila P of degree at most k such that y i = P (x i ) for at least t values of i.
Oblivious Polymonial Evaluation (OPE)
In an Oblivious Polynomial Evaluation OP E(τ, F) protocol, S has a secret polynomial f (X) of degree at most τ over a finite field F, and C has a secret field element x * . In the protocol, C learns f (x * ), but nothing more. S gains no information about x * . The security is formally defined as follows.
(The Chooser's Security) A protocol is secure for the chooser if for any x 0 , x 1 ∈ F and for any malicious sender S, the view of S for x = x 0 and that for x 1 are computationally indistinguishable given f (X).
(The Sender's Security) We make a comparison with an ideal world in which a trusted third party (TTP) receives f (X) from a sender and x * from a chooser. He then tells f (x * ) to the chooser. 
Definition 5.2 We say that a protocol is secure for the sender if the above (l) is negligible.
Definition 5.3 We say that a protocol is an OP E(τ, F) protocol if it is
secure for the chooser and the sender.
Protocol for k = 1
In what follows, suppose that |F| ≥ |W | and let G be a pseudo-random generator.
For simplicity, we first show a OKS n 1 protocol. Commit phase T chooses a random polynomial f (X) = aX + b over F such that a = 0. T then computes
Transfer phase (Step 1) U chooses a keyword w * .
(
Step 2) T and U run an OP E(1, F) protocol so that U learns K 0 = f (w * ).
Correctness: It is easy to see that the final J is equal to Search(w * ) with probability at least 1 − n/2 l .
User's security: T has no information on w * from the chooser's security of the OP E(1, F) protocol.
We next prove the database's security in the random oracle model. In the random oracle model, we say that a protocol is (q, (l))-secure for the database if eq.(1) holds for any malicious user U who makes at mostueries to the random oracle G. Then the following theorem holds.
Theorem 5.1 Suppose that the underlying OP E(1, F) protocol is (l)-secure for the sender. Then our protocol is (q, (l))-secure for the database, where
A proof is given in the next subsection.
Proof of Theorem 5.1
Wlog, we can consider that any malicious user U consists of ( U 0 , U 1 , U 2 ) as follows.
• U 0 receives E 1 , · · · , E n from T and outputs view * = (α,
where α is the random input to U.
• U 1 has an auxiliarly input view * . It executes the OP E(1, F) protocol with T and outputs view 1 , where view 1 is the view that U 1 saw and view 1 includes view * .
• U 2 has an auxiliarly input view 1 and outputs the output of U.
There exists a simulator B which simulates U 1 from the sender's security of the OP E protocol. That is, the output of B is indistinguishable from that of U 1 if they have the same auxiliarly input view * . By using this B, we consider an imaginal protocol (T , U ) as follows, where T plays the role of the TTP in the ideal world of the OP E protocol.
Step 1'. T chooses f (X) and computes E 1 , · · · , E n in the same way as in the original protocol. T then sends E 1 , · · · , E n to U .
Step 2'. U runs B with the auxiliarly input view * = (α, E 1 , · · · , E n ), where α is a random string. In this process, suppose that B queries w * to the TTP in the ideal world of OP E. Then
Step 2'-1. U queries w * to T .
Step 2'-2. T gives
B finally outputs view 1
Step 3'. U runs U 2 with the auxiliarly input view 1 . U then outputs the output of U 2 .
Now we show a simulator A for U of our OKS protocol. A behaves similarly to T by using B and U 2 as subroutines as follows.
Step a. A chooses E 1 , · · · , E n randomly and runs B with the auxiliarly input view * = (α, E 1 , · · · , E n ), where α is a random string.
Step b. If B queries w * , then A chooses a random string K 0 which has never been queried to the random oracle G and gives K 0 to B.
A also queries w * to the TTP in the ideal world of OKS and receives Search(w * ).
Step c. B finally outputs view 1 .
Step d. A runs U 2 with the auxiliarly input view 1 and outputs the output of U 2 .
A simulates the random oracle G as follows. Suppose that On the other hand, B is a simulator of U 1 and they have the same auxiliarly input view * . Therefore, their outputs must be indistinguishable. Hence we must have
However, this is a contradiction.
Q.E.D.
(Proof) In the imaginal protocol (T , U ):
• Let BAD 1 be the event that U queries some
• Let BAD 2 be the event that U queries some (K i) to G such that K = f (w i ) and i is not included in Search(w * ) after K 0 is given to U .
Let BAD be the event that BAD 1 or BAD 2 occurs. If BAD does not occur in the imaginal protocol (T , U ), then A simulates G perfectly. We next estimate Pr(BAD). Suppose that U queries to G at most q 1 times before K 0 is given and at most q 2 times after K 0 is given, where q 1 + q 2 ≤ q. It is easy to see that for any w i and for any K,
where the probability is taken over f (X) = aX + b such that a = 0. Therefore,
Similarly,
for any w i = w * and any K. Therefore,
Q.E.D. Therefore we obtain that
Protocol for k ≥ 2
We next show a OKS n k protocol for k ≥ 2. Let P (k, F) be the set of polynomials of degree at most k over F. We assume that gcd(k, |F| − 1) = 1. Now the probability that f (w i ) = f (w j ) for some w i = w j is at most n 2 1 |F| . Therefore, we obtain Lemma 5.3. Q.E.D. Suppose that |F| n 2 . Then a randomly chosen f (X) ∈ P (k, F) is good with high probability from lemma 5.3. Now our OKS n k protocol is obtained by slightly modifying the OKS n 1 protocol of Sec. 5.2 as follows.
• In the commit phase, T chooses a good f (X) ∈ P (k, F) randomly by trial and error.
• At Step 2 of the transfer phase, T and U run an OP E(k, F) protocol.
The rest of the protocol is the same as Sec. 5.2. The correctness and the user's security are clear. We can prove the database's security similarly to Theorem 5.1.
Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced a notion of Oblivious Keyword Search (OKS). We then showed two efficient protocols such that the size of the commitments is only O(nB) regardless of the size of W , where nB is the size of the database and W is the set of all possible keywords.
• The first scheme assumes the intractability of the one-more RSAinversion problem and the second one assumes the intractability of the polynomial reconstruction problem.
• The first scheme is more efficient. The second scheme is based on a more widely accepted assumption.
We further presented a more efficient adaptive OT n k protocol than the previous one [19] as an application of our first OKS protocol.
Usually, each content would have more than one keywords. Therefore, it will be a further work to construct an efficient protocol which can handle more than one keywords. It will also be a further work to derive a lower bound on the size of commitments.
